Sometimes we imagine fictional worlds or live in them. A fascinating video game, book or movie, or a VR setting might have that effect. Temporarily, this can even be an immersive experience, in which we – for a while – forget that we are a fictional world. Beyond media use, the underlying concepts or imagination and fictional worlds have been a metaphor for and suggested core characteristic for several aspects of human cognition. These include what social cognition is about, what creativity is, how we understand others, what is going on delusional subjects, what characterizes games or any sort (from playing soccer to chess to children’s ‘hide and seek’), and what underlies the perception of all art forms. (Goldman 2006, Nguyen 2020, Ratcliffe 2004, Walton 1994) Thereby, my topic is sensory imagination, not propositional imagination or sensory imagery. At stake is conscious experience while being in these settings, not our ability for abstract hypothetical thinking or possible worlds. I present a new argument for eliminativism regarding sensory imagination. It has been argued before that imagination is a heterogenous or vague concept, a bundle concept or that there are better ones. (Kind 2023, Currie/ Ravenscroft 2002, Nanay 2023) I argue, the situation is worse: since it is not a natural kind, it is an utterly useless concept for scientific purposes, even if one uses the broadest understanding of what is required for a concept to have explanatory purpose. (Boyd 1999)

Authors:
Verena Gottschling, York University, Canada

About the Presenter(s)
Professor Verena Gottschling is a University Associate Professor/Senior Lecturer at York University, Toronto in Canada

Connect on Linkedin
https://gottschling-net.de/background.html

See this presentation on the full schedule – On Demand Schedule

Bookmark